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Abstract
Protection of privacy; fundamental human right; UN Declaration, European Convention on
Human Rights; EU Directives and Recommendations; National laws; lawful interception of
communications; data protection; encryption; duties of telecommunications network
operators; interception by foreign governments; possible action by EU to require
telecommunications network operators to protect users’ privacy
Executive summary
Privacy of communications is one of the
fundamental human rights. The UN
Declaration, International Covenant and
European Convention all provide that
natural persons should not be subject to
unlawful interference with their privacy.
The European Convention is legally
binding and has caused signatories to
change their national laws to comply.
Most countries, including most EU
Member States, have a procedure to
permit and regulate lawful interception of
communications, in furtherance of law
enforcement or to protect national
security.  The European Council has
proposed a set of technical requirements
to be imposed on telecommunications
operators to allow lawful interception.
USA has defined similar requirements
(now enacted as Federal law) and
Australia has proposed to do the same.
Most countries have legal recognition of
the right to privacy of personal data and
many require telecommunications
network operators to protect the privacy
of their users. All EU countries permit the
use of encryption for data transmitted via
public telecommunications networks
(except France where this will shortly be
permitted).
Electronic commerce requires secure and
trusted communications and may not be
able to benefit from privacy law designed
only to protect natural persons.
The legal regimes reflect a balance
between three interests:
• privacy;
• law enforcement;
• electronic commerce.
Legal processes are emerging to satisfy
the second and third interests by granting
more power to governments to authorise
interception (under legal controls) and
allowing strong encryption with secret
keys.
There do not appear to be adequate legal
processes to protect privacy against
unlawful interception, either by foreign
governments or by non-governmental
bodies.
A course of action open to the EU is to
require telecommunications operators to
take greater precautions to protect their
users against unlawful interception. This
would appear to be possible without
compromising law enforcement or
electronic commerce.
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1 Context
This study has been prepared by Dr Chris Elliott1 for the Scientific and Technological
Options Assessment programme of the European Parliament. It is a contribution to the
project on "Development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of economic
information". This study examines the legality of the interception of electronic
communications.
The study is intended to be brief and concise. It concentrates on instruments that exist and
not on the debate that led to them. It also avoids speculation as to the evolution of law in
this field or the moral and ethical challenges that it poses.
Three levels of instrument are considered:
• International agreements
• EU Decisions and Directives
• National laws (of EU Member states and significant third countries)
Legislation in this field attempts to reconcile three conflicting pressures:
• Respect for privacy -  Privacy is a fundamental human right. International agreements
and national laws are more concerned with the rights of natural persons than with
those of legal persons (companies).
• Capabilities for law enforcement - The lawful interception of communications is
important for law enforcement agencies and most countries have legal procedures to
authorise and regulate interception.
• Needs of electronic commerce - Secure communication is essential to permit electronic
commerce to develop and may require the use of encryption which might conflict with
the requirements of law enforcement.
The study extends beyond interception to consider encryption, since this is an important
potential counter to interception and is also subject to some legal control. It also considers
data protection law regarding the storage and manipulation of personal information where
it applies to the transmission of that information.
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2 International agreements
2.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 12 states that
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy , .... or
correspondence, ... Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference ...
A key word in this Article is "arbitrary". Lawful interference is not excluded.
2.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
This UN Covenant2 builds on the Universal Declaration and is legally binding. By Art. 2.1,
the Contracting Parties are obliged to respect and ensure all of the rights recognised by
the Covenant, and by Art. 2.2 they are required to take steps to meet their obligations
within their own legal systems. Art. 4 allows Contracting Parties to derogate from some of
the specific Articles (ie Rights) in a Public Emergency.
Article 17 states that:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy ...
and that:
Everyone has a right to the protection of the law against such interference...
This appears to address only natural, not legal, persons and reinforces the idea that lawful
interference is permitted.
2.3 European Convention of Human Rights
Article 8 of the Convention3 states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
It is not clear whether this offers any protection to legal persons. It has been used to test
the legality of national procedures for the official interception of communications (eg
Klass4) and to force European states to introduce a legal procedure (eg Malone5).
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2.4 OECD Guidelines
OECD has adopted guidelines6 which, although primarily concerned with encryption, have
a bearing on interception. Recommendation 5 states:
The fundamental rights of individuals to privacy, including secrecy of
communications ..., should be respected in national cryptographic policies and in
the implementation and use of cryptographic methods.
2.5 Council of Europe
Article 7 of the Data Protection Convention7 requires that appropriate security measures
shall be taken for the protection of personal data against unauthorised access or
dissemination.
Recommendation R(95)13 of the Committee of Ministers (adopted September 11 1995)
"concerning criminal procedural law connected with information technology"
recommended:
• that criminal laws should be modified to allow interception in the investigation of serious
offences against telecommunications or computer systems; and
• that measures should be considered to minimise the negative effects of cryptography
without affecting its use more than is strictly necessary.
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3 EU legislation and agreements
3.1 INFOSEC Green Paper
The Commission resolved to prepare a Green Paper on the security of information
systems8 but, although several drafts were prepared, none has been adopted. The drafts
dealt with issues of encryption, digital signatures and privacy enhancement.
3.2 Council Resolution
The Council Resolution on the lawful interception of telecommunications9 notes a list of
Requirements of Member States to allow them to conduct the lawful interception of
telecommunications. The Resolution continues that Member States should take these
Requirements into account when defining national measures and in relation to network
operators.
The set of Requirements appears to cover of all aspects of interception. It requires
telecommunications network operators or service providers to make available details of the
addresses and contents of communications, to do so in a way which is not apparent to the
users being monitored and, where the operators use encryption, to provide decrypted (en
clair) versions of intercepted communications.
The Requirements closely match those identified by the FBI in the USA, which led to
CALEA (see section 4.2 below), and by the Barrett Review in Australia (also section 4.2).
3.3 Directive 95/46/EC
This Directive was primarily concerned with the protection of data stored in databases and
is of only indirect relevance to interception of communications. However, the Preamble
includes:
(2) Whereas data-processing systems are designed to serve man; whereas they
must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural persons, respect their
fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, and contribute to
economic and social progress, trade expansion and the well-being of individuals;
and the Directive starts:
Article 1: Object of the Directive
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.
3.4 Directive 97/66/EC
The preamble makes it clear that this Directive, like 95/46, does not address issues of
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms related to activities which are not governed
by Community law. It does not affect the right of Member States to take such measures as
- 7 -
they consider necessary for the protection of public security, defence, State security
(including the economic well-being of the State when the activities relate to State security
matters) and the enforcement of criminal law.
However, Article 5 states that Member States shall ensure via national regulations the
confidentiality of communications by means of a public telecommunications network and
publicly available telecommunications services. In particular, they shall prohibit listening,
tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications, by others
than users, without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised.
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4 National legislation
4.1 EU member states
There are broadly similar legislative regimes in all countries of the EU. Rather than
repeating the analysis of each of them, the regime in the UK will be described in detail and
any significant differences of principle in other countries will be noted. The information
given here for the UK has been taken from primary sources; less reliable and less up-to-
date secondary sources have been used to derive the corresponding information for other
EU Member States. The Author would be grateful for any primary information or better
secondary information on the legal regime in those countries.
United Kingdom
The starting point is section 5 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, which makes it illegal
to use any wireless telegraphy apparatus with intent to obtain information as to the
contents, sender or addressee of any message which the user is not authorised to receive,
or to disclose any information obtained in that way. This does not apply to interception
authorised by the government and to disclosure in legal proceedings.
The Interception of Communications Act 1985 was passed following the case of Malone
before the ECHR (see section 2.3 above). Section 1 maintains the rule of section 5 WTA
’49. Section 2 permits the Secretary of State to issue a warrant authorising interception of
post or a public telecommunications system if he considers it necessary:
• in the interests of national security
• for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or
• for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK.
This Act provides a procedure to authorise interception of Internet messages but not
messages being transmitted within private networks. Interception of the signal from a
cordless telephone to its base is excluded10, as are the signals emitted by a cellular
telephone (but the subsequent transmission of those signals via the cellular network is
included because that is a public telecommunications network).
S1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 makes it a crime knowingly to cause a computer to
perform any function with intent to secure unauthorised access to any program or data
held in any computer. Although it is primarily intended to criminalise "hacking", it would
appear to apply to the use of a computer (including one embedded inside interception
equipment) to intercept data being transmitted between two other computers.
The Data Protection Act 1984 gives legal effect to eight data protection principles which
follow those of the Council of Europe Convention. Principle 8 requires data users to take
appropriate security measures against unauthorised access to personal data. "Personal
data" refers to living natural persons, not legal persons.
There are no legal restrictions in the UK on the importation, possession or use of
encryption equipment. However, in criminal proceedings, section 20 of the Police and
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Criminal Evidence Act 1984 permits the authorities, where they may demand evidence
derived from a computer, also to require it to be made readable.
Austria
There is a general data protection law11 and further detailed rules which govern the
transmission of personal data. The general legal framework for telecommunications
(TKG)12 does not provide specific sanctions for breaching these rules. It does however
impose a criminal sanction of up to 3 months imprisonment for illegal interception of
transmissions. Telecommunication network operators are required to set up systems to
allow the criminal courts to make interceptions (TKG Art 89) and to warn users that the
network may not be secure (TKG 90).
Belgium
There are criminal sanctions13 against the ownership or use of equipment for the
interception of private communications, other than by an officer of the state. Similar
sanctions apply to such an officer who abuses the right to intercept communications or
divulges any material that has been lawfully obtained by interception.
Denmark
Danish law provides specific penalties for passing on or exploiting third party
communications by network operators or their employees14. A further law15 requires mobile
communications licensees to keep confidential any communications through their
networks.
Operators are required to take all precautions necessary to prevent unauthorised persons
gaining access to information.
Finland
The Telecommunications Market Act16 imposes a general duty of confidentiality on
telecommunication network operators, their staff and contractors. The wider duties under
the Personal Data Act also prevent disclosure. There are criminal sanctions for breach of
these duties, unless the disclosure is, with the consent of the subscriber, to appropriate
authorities to prevent misuse of the telecommunication system.
Law enforcement officials may demand disclosure of information or recordings of calls if
investigating certain crimes listed in the Coercive Measures Act17. Telecommunications
network operators are required to provide the necessary facilities, which are funded by
Government.
France
Telecommunications network operators are required to respect the secrecy of
correspondence18 and there are criminal sanctions for deliberate violation19. Private
conversations may only be intercepted under certain conditions, when authorised by the
judiciary or administration20.
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The UK approach of permitting the use encryption for transmission over public networks is
shared by all other Member States except France. The current law in France21 permits the
use of cryptography for authentication but requires confidentiality systems to be authorised
and for keys to be deposited with a State-designated key escrow. Until recently only 40 bit
codes were permitted but, in January 1999, the French government announced that all
restrictions would be lifted.
Germany
Privacy of the content of telecommunications is guaranteed by the constitution and
operators authorised by the TKG22 are subject to criminal sanctions (s85 TKG) if they
breach this duty. The operators must also take appropriate technical precautions or other
measures to protect the privacy of telecommunications and personal data. Security
requirements are specified by the regulatory authority23.
The operators are required, by s88 TKG, to set up (at their own expense) facilities to
support legally prescribed interception.
Greece
The right to privacy of telephone and other telecommunications is protected by Article 19
of the Constitution. This right may be withdrawn on application to the Court of Appeal
judge prosecutor from the courts or civil, military or police authorities in the interests of
national security or in the detection of specified crimes.  Applications are overseen by the
National Commission for the Protection of Privacy in Communication24.
Ireland
There is protection for personal data within the Data Protection Act 1988 but there is no
specific provision in Irish law to protect the security and confidentiality of
telecommunications services.
Italy
Like Ireland, the only protection is within the implementation of the Data Protection
Directive in Italian law25. This does however extend to data about entities and associations
as well as individuals and might provide some protection against unlawful interception.
Luxembourg
Again there is only protection in terms of data protection, concerning the storage and
transmission of data about an individual26.
Netherlands
There is a general duty on telecommunications network operators to abide by the rules of
personal data set out in the Data Protection Act27. More detailed rules are given in the
Telecommunications Act28 which was expected to become law late in 1998. This gives
effect to Directive 97/66/EC. Article 11.2 of that Act imposes a general duty on
telecommunications network operators and service providers to protect the privacy of their
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users. This is interpreted by Article 11.3 to require them to have a level of security which is
appropriate to the state of technology and implementation costs, and in proportion to the
level of threat.
Portugal
Personal data is protected29 but there is no explicit protection for the privacy of
communications.
Spain
The only specific protection is the general data protection law30 but the telecommunication
legislation31 32 contain statements on the duty to preserve the confidentiality and secrecy
of communications
Sweden
The Telecommunications Act 198733 imposes an obligation of confidentiality on individuals
who obtain access to telecommunications messages in the course of their duties. There
are well-defined circumstances under which this obligation may lawfully be breached.
The Data Protection Act34 also applies to data transmitted by telecommunications systems.
4.2 Third countries
United States of America
Interception is generally illegal in the United States but is permitted in most States under
stringent rules designed to protect privacy but allow the investigation of crime, including a
requirement to obtain a court order before conducting an interception. There are two basic
pieces of Federal legislation: ECPA35 which concerns criminal investigations and FISA36
which concerns intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
ECPA works like many European legal frameworks, in that it sets in place a procedure to
authorise lawful interception. Network operators and service providers are required by
CALEA37 to have the necessary technical facilities and to render assistance to law
enforcement agencies. The requirements of CLEA are similar to those of the Council
Resolution (see section 3.2 above).
FISA authorises electronic surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers to
obtain foreign intelligence information.  FISA defines this in terms of U.S. national security,
including defence against attack, sabotage, terrorism, and clandestine intelligence
activities.  The targeted communications need not relate to any crime.  FISA surveillance
actions are implemented operationally by the FBI. Electronic surveillance conducted under
FISA is classified.
There are two limbs to FISA:
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• Communications to or from US persons (natural or legal) but not U.S. persons who are
overseas (unless the communications are with a U.S. person who is inside the U.S.). A
court order is required to authorise interception;
• Communications exclusively between or among foreign powers or involving technical
intelligence other than spoken communications from a location under the open and
exclusive control of a foreign power. An intercept may be authorised by a Presidential
order.
Australia
Australia is of interest to Europe because it has recently examined in some detail the
requirements for lawful interception capability.  The Barrett Review38 concluded that
telecommunications interception is highly cost-effective when compared with other forms
of surveillance. The Review supported the development of "international user
requirements" as the most effective means of international cooperation to ensure that law
enforcement’s needs are taken into account in the development of new technology. The
conclusions were similar to those of the Council Recommendation (see section 3.2 above)
in that they call for network operators to be required to support lawful interception whilst at
the same time strengthening the duty of the operators to protect confidentiality against
unlawful interception.
The Review calls for international agreed standards. It concludes that unilateral action by
Australia to demand interceptable and secure national technology might lead to less than
world-class technology being used and hence to a major economic disadvantage. It
continues "the sooner an international requirement for interception is standardised and
accepted, the more likely there will be the automatic provision of a telecommunications
intercept capability in new technology with similar implications for all users".
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5 Observations
Several main points and trends are clear:
• Human rights legislation, particularly ECHR, clearly provides a robust protection for
natural persons against unlawful interception by the State of communications. It is not
clear to what extent this legislation would protect legal persons;
• Most EU Member States have, and it might be expected that all soon will have, a
procedure to authorise lawful interception by the State;
• The EU, USA and Australia appear to be converging on a common set of interception
requirements which ensure that network operators do everything necessary to permit
lawful interception;
• Many EU Member States already require telecommunications network operators to
take technical precautions to protect privacy of communications (ie against unlawful
interception);
• The economic benefits of encryption to allow secure e-commerce are seen as
outweighing the social losses to law enforcement, and soon all EU Member States will
have no restrictions on the use of encryption.
The position is less clear with regard to interception by foreign powers, particularly
because of the fundamental technological change from switched circuits to packet
switching. The former allows the network operator to control the route by which
communications pass between subscribers. The latter reflects the underlying principle of
the Internet, in that packets of data go by whatever route is convenient. It may for example
be easier to route a packet from the south to the north of France via the USA at 09.30
French Time if most US assets are underused at that time and the French national
network is at peak demand.
Consider two subscribers within country A, communicating with each other via a network
operating in country A. Interception of communications by a person in country B while the
communications are passing within country A would appear to be unlawful. Under these
circumstances the subscribers would have a right of recourse to ECHR and country B
would be in breach of ICCPR. Even if the interception is lawful in country B (for example
FISA could make the interception lawful if country B is the USA), it is not lawful in country
A unless country B has express permission by the authorisation procedure of country A.
Now consider the case where their communication is routed via country B. It is possible
that the lawful procedure for interception could be followed in country B. In particular, FISA
could make the interception lawful if country B is the USA; the network operator in the USA
would be obliged to comply with a lawful request to support that interception. Similarly
IOCA could make it lawful if country B was UK.
It is claimed that some countries have the technological capability to intercept
communications been carried entirely on a network within another country and it is the
policy of many countries to be able to do so when the communication is (even temporarily)
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within that country. Legal protection against the former is weak or inconvenient; against
the latter it is non-existent.
A possible course of action for the EU to protect privacy without compromising law
enforcement would be to extend and enforce the requirement for network operators to
protect the privacy of communications. Technical means exist which could achieve this at
three levels:
1. Telecommunications network operators to apply strong encryption to the content of
communications. As the operators would hold the keys to this encryption, they could
meet the Requirements of the Council Resolution.
2. Anonymous re-routing services to provide encryption of the addresses of
communications. Again they could meet the Requirements but this would provide
additional protection against unlawful interception leading to what is know in military
intelligence as "traffic analysis" - even where the content of messages cannot be
decrypted, the names of the sender and recipient can provide valuable intelligence.
3. Readily available private encryption to allow those who require greater security to
encrypt their messages with a private key. An approach to reconciling this with law
enforcement has been proposed in Denmark39. This in effect reverses the burden of
proof in criminal cases. Where there is:
• circumstantial evidence of guilt;
• encrypted material which might prove guilt;
• the defendant chooses not to decrypt that material;
then the Court may draw an inference of guilt. This is analogous to the UK law on the
right to remain silent40 when questioned.
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